This article analyzes positions on pornography using Q-methodology. Eighty-five respondents sorted a sample of 86 opinion statements on definitions of pornography, personal reactions to it, its causes and effects, and social policy recommendations. Factor analysis was used to identify clusters of individuals in the United States who share common subjectively defined points of view on pornography. The three patterns of responses that emerged from the analysis were labeled Religious-Conservative, Liberal, and Antipornography Feminist. Using the empirical data, we examine the logical (...) and ethical structures of these points of view and their political and legal implications. We conclude that the viewpoints are too incompatible to sustain stable and effective political alignments among the adherents. (shrink)

In The Construction of Social Reality, John Searle develops a theory of institutional facts and objects, of which money, borders and property are presented as prime examples. These objects are the result of us collectively intending certain natural objects to have a certain status, i.e. to ‘count as’ being certain social objects. This view renders such objects irreducible to natural objects. In this paper we propose a radically different approach that is more compatible with standard economic theory. We claim (...) that such institutional objects can be fully understood in terms of actions and incentives, and hence the Searlean apparatus solves a non-existent problem. (shrink)

O debate entre J. Searle e D. Dennett acerca da possibilidade técnica de uma Inteligência artificial gira em torno de uma única questão: estados mentais expressam algo intrínseco, privado e subjetivo, experimentado em primeira-pessoa ou não passam de entidades obscurantistas, frutos da ignorância e, em princípio, reduzíveis à objetividade científica da neurociência? Searle defende a primeira tese, enquanto Dennett argumenta pela segunda. O texto expõe a posição de Dennett, a crítica de Searle e se direciona para uma (...) nova solução, que defende um monismo integral, no qual mente e cérebro podem ser vistos como duas dimensões de uma mesma realidade. Nesse sentido, o projeto de Inteligência artifical precisará revisar o conceito de “físico” se quiser avançar em suas pretenções, incluindo nele conceitos hoje antagônicos como intencionalidade, liberdade e subjetividade.: The debate between J. Searle and D. Dennett about the technical possibility of an artificial intelligence revolves around a single issue: mental states express something intrinsic, private and subjective, experienced in first-person or are merely obscurantist entities, results from ignorance and, in principle, reducible to scientific objectivity of neuroscience? Searle argues for the first position, while Dennett argues for the second. The text exposes the position of Dennett, the criticism of Searle and is directed to a new solution, which advocates an integral monism, in which mind and brain can be seen as two dimensions of the same reality. In this sense, the project of artificial intelligence need to review the concept of "physical" if it wants to advance its claims, including today antagonistic concepts such as intentionality, freedom and subjectivity. Keywords: physicalism, technique, artificial intelligence, John Searle, Daniel Dennett. (shrink)

The problem of how the brain produces consciousness, subjectivity and "something it is like to be" remains one of the greatest challenges to a complete science of the natural world. While various scientists and philosophers approach the problem from their own unique perspectives and in the terms of their own respective fields, Biophysics of Consciousness: A Foundational Approach attempts a consilience across disparate disciplines to explain how it is possible that an objective brain produces subjective experience. This volume unites the (...) cr me de la cr me of physicists, neuroscientists, and psychiatrists in the attempt to understand consciousness through a foundational approach encompassing ontological, evolutionary, neurobiological, and Freudian interpretations with the focus on conscious phenomena occurring in the brain. By integrating the perspectives of these diverse disciplines with the latest research and theories on the biophysics of the brain, the book tries to explain how what John Searle calls a "conscious field" can be an adaptive and causal element in the natural world. (shrink)

En este trabajo se discuten algunos problemas epistemológicos de la teoría de la mente de Searle, que derivan de su realismo externo (metafísico) e ingenuo. Éste le lleva, en primer lugar, a una problemática separación entre ontología y epistemología, que le permitirá sostener que hay hechos evidentes, previos e independientes a las teorías. Entre esos hechos incuestionables, en segundo lugar, sitúa las características que el sentido común atribuye a la mente y que trata de encajar, aunque es dudoso que (...) lo consiga, en un planteamiento científico, que exigiría cambiar la idea de objetividad. Finalmente, el realismo le aboca a un dualismo implícito contrario a su pretendido fisicalismo y más radical que el que le gustaría admitir. (shrink)

In his book The rediscovery of the mind John Searle claims that unconscious mental states (1) have first-person "aspectual shape", but (2) that their ontology is purely third-person. He attempts to eliminate the obvious inconsistency by arguing that the aspectual shape of unconscious mental states consists in their ability to cause conscious first-person states. However, I show that this attempted solution fails insofar as it covertly acknowledges that unconscious states lack the aspectual shape required for them to play a (...) role in psychological explanation. (shrink)

In The Rediscovery of the Mind, John Searle offers a novel theory of consciousness that attempts to overcome the traditional debates within the philosophy of mind between dualism and materialism. Searle maintains that one can be a thoroughgoing materialist without denying the existence of mental phenomena that are inherently subjective in nature. In this paper I argue that Searle's view does not so easily bypass the traditional philosophical debate between materialism and dualism, and, indeed, that Searle's (...) attempt to have it both ways is inconsistent. More specifically, I examine Searle's discussion of the causal reducibility of consciousness and his claim that consciousness is just another property of certain biological systems and argue that in both cases Searle has failed to show that consciousness can be both irreducibly subjective and a normal physical feature of the brain. (shrink)

What does being money consist in? We argue that something is money if, and only if, it is typically acquired in order to realise the reduction in transaction costs that accrues in virtue of agents coordinating on acquiring the same thing when deciding what thing to acquire in order to exchange. What kinds of things can be money? We argue against the common view that a variety of things (notes, coins, gold, cigarettes, etc.) can be money. All monetary systems are (...) best interpreted as implementing the same basic protocol. Money, i.e. the thing that we coordinate on acquiring in order to lower our transaction costs, is, in all cases, a set of positions on an abstract mathematical object, namely a relative ratio scale. The things that we ordinarily call ‘money’ are merely records of positions on such a scale. (shrink)

The practice of coercive measures in psychiatry is controversial. Although some have suggested that it may be acceptable if patients are a danger to others or to themselves, others committed themselves to eliminate it. Ethical, legal and clinical considerations become more complex when the mental incapacity is temporary and when the coercive measures serve to restore autonomy. We discuss these issues, addressing the conflict between autonomy and beneficence/non-maleficence, human dignity, the experiences of patients and the effects of coercive measures. We (...) argue that an appeal to respect autonomy and/or human dignity cannot be a sufficient reason to reject coercive measures. All together, these ethical aspects can be used both to support and to reject a non-seclusion approach. The total lack of controlled trials about the beneficial effects of coercive measures in different populations however, argues against the use of coercive measures. (shrink)

(No abstract is available for this citation).

Mathematical tradition has it that transformations characterized by a negative Jacobian determinant are referred to as improper transformations. The symmetry of a physical object corresponding to such an improper transformation becomes an improper symmetry. Improper symmetries have been successfully used for the purpose of crystal symmetry. The extension of these purely spatial symmetries to the domain of spacetime has led to a prejudicial use of light-cone properties, thus affecting adversely an unbiased symmetry classification. We pinpoint these prejudicial procedures and trace (...) their historical origin, while presenting an alternative that restores an unbiased treatment of improper spacetime symmetries. The applications discussed relate to recent developments in the symmetry classification of magnetic crystals and to the extension of Neumann's principle to the time domain. (shrink)

The collection and disposal of rubbish and waste and the maintenance of a decent standard of hygiene was as much a problem for ancient city authorities as for modern town councils. The responsibility for the removal of waste would often be dependent upon the nature of the rubbish and the facilities which city authorities offered. Thus early in the fourth century B.C. the agoranomic law from Piraeus prohibited individuals from piling earth and other waste on the streets and compelled the (...) offender to remove it. The astynomic law from Pergamon, which probably dates originally to the Hellenistic period, similarly forbade the dumping or piling up of earth or the mixing of mortar on the streets of the city. As one of Demosthenes' speeches indicates, the effect of dumping rubbish indiscriminately was to raise the level of the road surface, which consequently restricted access and endangered adjacent property. Excavation of a triangular hieron to the south west of the agora at Athens further illustrates the results of dumping. Here it was found that, between the construction of the hieron in the late fifth century B.C. and the beginning of the fourth century B.C, the road surface on its northern side rose more than half a metre and covered the lower part of the wall of the hieron and its boundary marker. The accumulated fill included a deep layer of marble chips, which had been dumped in the area by marble workers. The laws from Piraeus and Pergamon were thus designed to keep streets passable, protect adjacent buildings, and safeguard pedestrians. (shrink)

Contemporary discussion concerning institutions focus on, and mostly accept, the Searlean view that institutional objects, i.e. money, borders and the like, exist in virtue of the fact that we collectively represent them as existing. A dissenting note has been sounded by Smit et al. (Econ Philos 27:1–22, 2011), who proposed the incentivized action view of institutional objects. On the incentivized action view, understanding a specific institution is a matter of understanding the specific actions that are associated with the institution and (...) how we are incentivized to perform these actions. In this paper we develop the incentivized action view by extending it to institutions like property, promises and complex financial organisations like companies. We also highlight exactly how the incentivized action view differs from the Searlean view, discuss the method appropriate to such study and discuss some of the virtues of the incentivized action view. (shrink)

We analyse the relationship between applicability and effectiveness of legal norms from a philosophical perspective. In particular, we distinguish between two concepts of applicability. The external applicability of norms refers to institutional duties; a norm N is externally applicable if and only if a judge is legally obliged to apply N to some case c. Internal applicability refers instead to the sphere of validity of legal norms. A norm N is internally applicable to actions regulated by its sphere of validity. (...) We also explore the consequences of a thesis which maintains that applicability restricts the concept of effectiveness, so that only applicable norms can be considered effective. Our analysis illustrates that a proper reconstruction of the concept of applicability is of great importance not only for understanding the concept of effectiveness but also for providing insight into the nature of law. (shrink)